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COMMENT




The intersection of healthcare and technology is a rapidly growing area.
One thriving field at this intersection involves obtaining, processing, and stor-
ing genetic data. While the benefits have been great, genetic information can
reveal a great deal about individuals and their families. And the information
that can be conveyed from genetic data appears limitless and is constantly
growing and changing. Many entities have begun storing, processing, and
sharing genetic data on a very large scale. This creates many privacy concerns
that the current regulatory framework does not account for. The line between
patient data and consumer data is blurred; many entities are interested in ob-
taining genetic data with varied interests. In the direct-to-consumer genetic
testing market, consumers pay to send private companies their DNA samples
in exchange for a trivial amount of information about their ancestry and
health risks. But health data obtained and processed by a company are sub-
jected to far less stringent privacy regulations than health data obtained and
processed at a doctor’s office or hospital. This Comment summarizes some of
the current genetic privacy problems in United States laws and examines the
EU’s recently adopted GDPR for a possible solution. A GDPR-style regula-
tion could provide more consistency, give individuals more control, and pro-
tect against future unknown uses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare has entered the “age of genomics” with emerging tech-
nologies, big data, and complex analytics driving rapid advancements
in genomic research.1 This research requires access to immense stores
of individual genetic and associated health data.2 In September 2018,
the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) provided $28.6 million in
funding to establish three large-scale genome centers, focused on gen-
erating genomic data.3 The participants in this program will share
their genetic information and health records.4 In return, participants
may receive information about their risk for diseases, drug-gene inter-
actions, and ancestry information.5 In addition, NIH awarded a $7
million contract to a software company that builds big-data plat-
forms.6 Scientists will use the new software and data platform with a
goal to “accelerate the discovery of new therapies for cancer and
other illnesses.”7 Ultimately, NIH hopes to create a database of more
than one million biosamples and associated health information.8
Private companies are also collecting, storing, and sharing consumer
health data on very large scales.9 One example of massive genetic data
collection by a private company is through direct-to-consumer DNA
testing.10 Direct-to-consumer DNA testing companies are growing
1. Fida K. Dankar et al., The Development of Large-Scale De-Identified Biomedi-
cal Databases in the Age of Genomics—Principles and Challenges, 12 HUM. GE-
NOMICS 19, 1 (2018).
2. Id.
3. NIH-Funded Genome Centers to Accelerate Precision Medicine Discoveries,





6. National Institutes of Health Awards Palantir with Contract to Advance Critical





8. NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, supra note 3.
9. See BIS Research, Global Big Data in Healthcare Market to Reach $68.75 Bil-
lion by 2025, Reports BIS Research, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 28, 2018, 7:30 AM ET),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-big-data-in-healthcare-market-to-
reach-6875-billion-by-2025-reports-bis-research-678151823.html [https://perma.cc/
57EP-FLHT] (predicting that global big data in the healthcare market will reach
$68.75 billion by 2025).
10. Tobias Haeusermann et al., Open Sharing of Genomic Data: Who Does it and
Why? PLOS ONE, 2017, at 4.
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rapidly and hiring new employees for “large-scale processing of genet-
ics data.”11 For example, GlaxoSmithKline, one of the world’s largest
pharmaceutical companies, recently purchased a $300 million stake in
23andMe, a large private consumer genetic testing company.12 Just
months later, the FDA approved 23andMe’s application to market re-
ports regarding whether consumers may have  genetic variants that
could affect their reaction to certain medications.13 Even Facebook
tried to break into this field by attempting to partner with a hospital to
combine patient information with social network information.14
The collection, storage, and sharing of massive amounts of genetic
data by public and private entities raise many privacy concerns. First,
the blurred line between public and private researchers, companies,
patients, consumers, and hospitals means it can be difficult to know
whom patients and consumers are sharing their information with and
who is really benefitting. To blur the line further, companies have be-
gun to partner with physicians to help customers interpret their re-
sults.15 “Companies like Color Genomics and Invitae . . . allow
consumers to order a genetic test through a physician or genetic coun-
selor, who can help the customer interpret the results remotely.”16
Consumers are likely confused about who ultimately has access to
their genetic data.
Second, scholars have concluded there are gaps in the current pri-
vacy and discrimination regulations.17 Our current regulations offer
far less protection for genetic data disclosed and processed by a pri-
vate company as compared to disclosures of genetic data by a physi-
11. Jessica Kim Cohen, 23andMe is Hiring—Three Suggestions about the Com-
pany’s Growth, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REP. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.beck
ershospitalreview.com/data-analytics-precision-medicine/23andme-is-hiring-3-sugges
tions-about-the-company-s-growth.html [https://perma.cc/3J88-WZHC].
12. Jaime Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 23andMe’s Ge-
netic Data. Should You Be Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018), http://time.com/5349896/
23andme-glaxo-smith-kline/ [https://perma.cc/BS7U-KMQN].
13. Jessica Kim Cohen, 23andMe Moves Into Pharmacogenetics as FDA Green-
lights New Test, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.beckershospital
review.com/supply-chain/23andme-moves-into-pharmacogenetics-as-fda-greenlights-
new-test.html?origin=cioe&utm_source=cioe [https://perma.cc/7HLF-5AMY].
14. Kalev Leetaru, Facebook’s Medical Research Project Shows it Just Doesn’t Un-
derstand Consent, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2018, 11:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kalevleetaru/2018/04/05/facebooks-medical-research-project-shows-it-just-doesnt-
understand-consent/#555e6403453a [https://perma.cc/G6D9-DTWC].
15. Jessica Kim Cohen, New ‘Hybrid’ Approach to DNA Testing Mixes Direct-to-
Consumer, Clinical Care Models: 4 Notes, BECKER’S CLINICAL LEADERSHIP & INFEC-




17. Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and
Consumer Genomics Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks, 27 HEALTH
MATRIX 143, 167 (2017).
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cian or hospital.18 Also, some have suggested that genetic data most
likely cannot be anonymized.19 If genetic data cannot truly be anony-
mous, then statutes that allow sharing “anonymized genetic data” are
ineffective.20 Additionally, genetic data can implicate family members
who did not voluntarily provide their genetic data.21 Regulations that
require companies to obtain consent before sharing genetic data are
not effective if an implicated family member never consented to share
their information.22 Government use of this data to implicate family
members in the criminal law context is also a continuing concern.23
Finally, perfect compliance with all of the existing regulations is ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible. Health research and reports were
once mostly governed by hospitals and doctors’ offices and subjected
to laws that protected patient privacy.24 But now these projects are
frequently commercial private ventures subject to different laws.25
Further, regulations relevant to genetic privacy are complex. State
regulations vary in the degree of protection offered.26 The federal and
state regulations apply in different ways depending on how the infor-
mation is obtained, where it is processed, where the customer lives, or
where they obtain treatment.27 It is often unclear which law or rule
applies for each particular use.
This Comment argues that patient and consumer genetic data need
more protection. The ideal solution would have strong privacy protec-
tion, clarity between states and sectors, and adaptability for the fu-
ture.28 This Comment argues that the United States should adopt a
data privacy regulation similar to the European Union (“EU”) frame-
work, the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). Section II
discusses what genetic big data is, its importance, and its unique po-
18. Compare Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), with 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
19. See Drabiak, supra note 17, at 165.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 182.
22. See id. at 165.
23. The criminal law aspects are beyond the scope of this Comment, but for more
information see Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 757 (2016) (discussing the effect of genetic information on constitu-
tional rights). For more information about the Trump Administration’s recent plans to
collect DNA in federal detention facilities, see Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Government
Plans to Collect DNA From Detained Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/us/dna-testing-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/5VT5-
P9TV].
24. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
25. See Drabiak, supra note 17, at 162.
26. See infra Section III.
27. See infra Section III.
28. Gauthier Chassang, The Impact of the EU General Data Protection Regulation
on Scientific Research, ECANCERMEDICALSCIENCE (Mar. 1, 2017), https://ecancer
.org/journal/11/full/709-the-impact-of-the-eu-general-data-protection-regulation-on-
scientific-research.php [https://perma.cc/7Q94-EC38].
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tential for privacy harms. Section III reviews some of the federal and
state regulations that often apply to health data privacy. Section IV
considers the strengths and weaknesses of the GDPR. Section V ex-
amines potential strategies for protecting genetic data and the benefits
of the GDPR framework.
II. GENETIC DATA
Effective privacy regulations require clear definitions. The follow-
ing Section will provide a basic understanding of what genetic data is
and how it is typically used to demonstrate why it is exceptionally sen-
sitive and how the current regulations have gaps.
A. Defining Genetic Information and Data
DNA is the inherited material contained in almost every cell in the
human body, and it is made up of chemical building blocks.29 Genes
are the DNA sequences that give instructions for producing pro-
teins.30 A genome is the complete set of genetic instructions present in
almost every cell.31 The term “genetic information” is somewhat am-
biguous and defined by various statutes in different ways.32 Genetic
data typically include the raw data obtained from sequencing, the re-
port analyzing the raw data, and reported health data.33 Genetic infor-
mation can be anything that concerns individual genetic
characteristics or family genetic characteristics.34 Information ob-
tained from DNA, self-reported health data, or analysis performed by
a researcher—can all reveal information about genetics.35
Genetic testing is “any laboratory test of an individual’s complete
DNA, regions of DNA, chromosomes, genes, or gene products to de-
29. What is DNA?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept. 3, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
primer/basics/dna [https://perma.cc/SB62-9GJP].
30. DENNIS GRISHIN ET AL., BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED GENOMIC DATA SHARING
AND ANALYSIS PLATFORM 5 (2018), http://arep.med.harvard.edu/pdf/Grishin_Church
_v4.52_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/H42L-KZBK].
31. What is a Genome? NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept. 3, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih
.gov/primer/hgp/genome [https://perma.cc/7SDK-MX9H].
32. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No.
110-233, §101(d), 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (defining genetic information to include infor-
mation about genetic test results for individuals and their families and manifestations
of disease in their families). But see Nonprofit Healthcare Reform Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 550.1401(9)(b) (West 2012) (defining genetic information as information
about a gene, or gene product, or inherited characteristics from a gene test).
33. FUTURE PRIVACY F., PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES FOR CONSUMER GENETIC
TESTING SERVICES 11 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-
Practices-for-Consumer-Genetic-Testing-Services-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4
LA-3PFZ].
34. Id. at 13.
35. Susan Joung Rojahn, Study Highlights the Risk of Handing Over Your Gen-
ome, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/509901/
study-highlights-the-risk-of-handing-over-your-genome/ [https://perma.cc/9KHZ-UM
WL].
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termine the presence of the genetic characteristics in an individual or
an individual’s offspring.”36 Genetic testing involves collecting a sam-
ple of cells from a person—typically from hair, skin, blood, or saliva.37
The sample is sent to a lab, where the DNA is separated from the
other cells in the sample through DNA extraction.38 Many of the pop-
ular direct-to-consumer genetic testing services involve a consumer
purchasing a test tube with a barcode, submitting a saliva sample
through the mail for processing in a lab, and then data from the lab
are sent to the private company to interpret and communicate results
with the consumer.39
There are several methods for analyzing genetic information in the
lab. Genotyping is one method that finds variations in DNA se-
quences by comparing an individual sample to other samples.40 Se-
quencing is another method that examines the order of the
arrangement of DNA.41 But there are many other interesting methods
for analyzing individual differences in genes, including identifying the
location of DNA within the nucleus42 and studying the interactions
between genes.43
In general, genetic sequencing involves identifying the order and
arrangement of the building blocks of the chemical bases in an indi-
vidual’s DNA.44 These arrangements are “instructions for making and
maintaining a human being.”45 Variations in these arrangements
36. FUTURE PRIVACY F., supra note 33, at 11.
37. Id.
38. What Happens to My Sample at the Laboratory?, 23ANDME, https://customer-
care.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904590-What-happens-to-my-sample-at-the-
laboratory- (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/JMW2-NRC2].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. What is DNA Sequencing? NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www
.genome.gov/10001177/dna-sequencing-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/UZ5A-CULK]
[hereinafter What Is DNA Sequencing?].
42. See Elizabeth Pennisi, Moving DNA to a Different Part of the Nucleus Can
Change How it Works, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.sciencemag
.org/news/2018/10/moving-dna-different-part-nucleus-can-change-how-it-works
[https://perma.cc/AF3Z-VNBK].
43. See John Quackenbush, Using Networks to Link Genotype and Phenotype,
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Mar. 5, 2018), https://prevention.nih.gov/education-training/
methods-mind-gap/using-networks-link-genotype-phenotype [https://perma.cc/FUX4-
EGXZ] (“Dr. Quackenbush’s work has found that gene regulatory networks, and
their structure, provide unique insight into how genetic elements interact with each
other. He has also found that the structure of the network has predictive power for
identifying single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) likely to be associated with phe-
notype through genome-wide association studies.”).
44. What is DNA Sequencing?, supra note 41 (“In the DNA double helix, the four
chemical bases always bond with the same partner to form ‘base pairs.’ Adenine (A)
always pairs with thymine (T); cytosine (C) always pairs with guanine (G). This pair-
ing is the basis for the mechanism by which DNA molecules are copied when cells
divide, and the pairing also underlies the methods by which most DNA sequencing
experiments are done.”).
45. Id.
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(along with many other variables46) can convey information about an
individual’s physical features, their predisposition to certain condi-
tions or diseases, and their current health.47 All of this information
can be stored electronically in databases and shared with others.48
B. Big Data and Genetics
Information about individual genomes can be stored in various
ways. Genomes can be coded in a database and made publicly availa-
ble through a web portal.49 Information about individual genomes in
this format can easily be combined with other health data.50
Storing genetic information electronically results in a colossal
amount of data. The human genome has 6.4 billion building blocks,
including around 20,000 protein-coding genes.51 One method that re-
searchers use to make sense out of large amounts of data is data min-
ing.52 Data mining involves using algorithms and processes to analyze
data and find patterns.53 Data mining large genetic databases can help
to efficiently identify variants, commonalities, and patterns in genetic
information.54 Through data mining, genetic data can also more easily
be combined with other categories of data to better understand com-
plex and rare traits.55 Multiple sources help researchers achieve more
statistically reliable data.56 Since genetic traits are often the result of
many factors, this research is especially suited for data-mining
techniques.57
Research databases store and share genetic information in different
ways. One example is the Genotype-Tissue Expression Project under
46. See Virginie Orgogozo et al., The Differential View of Genotype–Phenotype
Relationships, FRONTIERS IN GENETICS (May 19, 2015), https://www.frontiersin.org/
articles/10.3389/fgene.2015.00179/full [https://perma.cc/6SUU-PUSU] (“A difference
in hair color could also be caused . . . by a combination of both genetic and non-
genetic differences.”).
47. DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Dec. 18, 2015), https://
www.genome.gov/10001177/dna-sequencing-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/GZ5K-PEU
D] [hereinafter DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet].
48. See GENEWATCH UK, THE DATA PROTECTION BILL: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DNA AND GENETIC DATA 1 (Feb. 2018), http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66
a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/DPBill_GWbrief_Feb18.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL63-9T
ZQ].
49. Dankar et al., supra note 1, at 7.
50. Id.
51. GRISHIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 5.
52. See Marylyn D. Ritchie et al., Methods of Integrating Data to Uncover Geno-
type–Phenotype Interactions, 16 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 85, 88 (2015).
53. See id. at 88–89.
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the National Institutes of Health.58 Researchers around the world use
this database to study the role of genetics in disease.59 One researcher
used this data to study how gene variants work together to determine
observable traits.60 He used the data to model and compare networks
between groups of individuals and found “new drug targets, explored
chemotherapy resistance, and investigated differences between the
sexes.”61 Another example of a genetic research database is an online
catalog with the specific mapped location of genetic variance, infor-
mation about the observed disease and relevant research, and the
clinical features of patients with that variance.62 Anyone with an email
address can get access to this information and can receive alerts about
research updates to specific genes or diseases.63 In early 2019, Chil-
dren’s Hospital of Philadelphia released an initial “8,000 DNA and
RNA samples from children and families affected by pediatric cancers
and structural birth defects” to the Kids First Data Resource Portal.64
This new portal allows approved researchers to quickly access data
relevant to rare pediatric diseases: imaging, genome sequencing, pa-
thology slides, and surgery details.65 The families give broad consent
for sharing their information, and users are required to share their
findings.66
C. Genetic Data is Valuable
Despite the potential for harm, genetic data sharing provides many
benefits. Patients and consumers need to weigh the benefits and
harms before undergoing genetic testing and sharing the results. The
patient or consumer should decide that the benefits outweigh the po-
tential harms before moving forward.
Many people have important and valid reasons for proceeding with
genetic testing despite the potential harms. They might want to know
about their own genetic information to understand their propensity
for developing certain diseases, to learn about their probability of hav-
ing a child with certain conditions, or to receive a more accurate diag-
58. Genotype-Tissue Expression Project, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.gen
ome.gov/27543767/genotypetissue-expression-project-gtex/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/2PV7-K4T5].
59. See id.
60. Quackenbush, supra note 43.
61. Id.
62. See An Online Catalog of Human Genes and Genetic Disorders, ONLINE MEN-
DELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN, https://omim.org/ (last updated Aug. 28, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/8M97-3VPP].
63. See id.
64. Neil Versel, CHOP-Led ‘Kids First’ Portal Features Big Datasets Without Em-
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nosis from a doctor. People often move forward with testing because
they want more information.
While individual genetic testing has numerous benefits, the benefits
of sharing genetic data appear limitless. Large-scale genetic data shar-
ing helps researchers identify variations in genetic makeup and the
significance of those variations more efficiently.67 Researchers can
make connections between variations in genetic makeup. They can
use those connections to explore the causes of different cancers, com-
plex diseases, defects, and developmental delays.68 One recent exam-
ple involved a partnership between a research institute and a tech
company to apply artificial intelligence to find patterns in different
types of data.69 Their first project will be combining genomic and sen-
sor data to predict atrial fibrillation.70 This is just one of many exam-
ples of how sharing genetic data can potentially save and improve
lives.
This mass-sharing of data is especially important for detecting rare
genetic variants that are more difficult to detect. The more people that
provide their data, the more likely researchers can find a pattern in a
variant. For example, a genetic variant for schizophrenia was not de-
tected with 3,500 cases, was faintly identifiable with 10,000 cases, but
was statistically significant with 35,000 cases.71 More people sharing
their genetic data increases the chances that researchers will find the
causes behind rare diseases.
Besides the research benefits, individual physicians also benefit
from large-scale sharing. Sharing genetic data helps to inform clinical
care and can improve prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of dis-
ease.72 Doctors can use data to identify risk factors for adverse reac-
67. What are the Next Steps in Genomic Research?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Oct. 1,
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/nextsteps [https://perma.cc/
7RQH-SW9V].
68. DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 47.
69. Jessica Kim Cohen, Scripps Partners with Nvidia to Apply AI to Genomic, Dig-




70. Id. See also Atrial Fibrillation, MAYO CLINIC (June 20, 2019), https://www
.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/atrial-fibrillation/symptoms-causes/syc-20350624
[https://perma.cc/89CF-T244] (“Atrial fibrillation is an irregular and often rapid heart
rate that can increase your risk of strokes, heart failure and other heart-related
complications.”).
71. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRE-
SERVING VALUES 7 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/42ZY-UHLA]; Ma-
nolis Kellis, Big Data Opportunities & Challenges in Human Disease Genetics & Ge-
nomics, BROAD INST. MIT & HARV. 13, http://web.mit.edu/bigdata-priv/ppt/
ManolisKellis_Big_PrivacyBigData_CSAIL-WH.pptx (last visited Oct. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/5CGP-CL8R].
72. See Effy Vayena & Alessandro Blasimme, Health Research with Big Data:
Time for Systemic Oversight, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 119, 119 (2018).
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tions to certain medications and prevent the adverse reaction.73
Physicians can plan for the most effective treatment by using data to
predict results.74 Genetic data is extremely valuable, and its potential
to improve healthcare is even more significant when shared on large
scales.
D. Unique Privacy Concerns
Although the benefits of sharing genetic data have proven remarka-
ble, there are many privacy concerns with the current system. Genetic
data is extremely sensitive because of how much it can reveal. Genetic
data can “identify us, reveal our propensity to a range of diseases, and
expose sensitive health information about biologically-linked family
members.”75 Third parties that have access to this information poten-
tially have “access to the innermost contents of your cells . . . .”76 This
includes access to an individual’s ethnicity and heritage, physical fea-
tures, predisposition to certain conditions or diseases, and current
health status.77 Additionally, genetic data is uniquely sensitive be-
cause the amount of information that can be conveyed increases with
advances in technology and research.78 Many researchers already
claim they can predict a wide range of traits based on genetic informa-
tion, including identification of sexual orientation, political behavior,
criminality,79 and intelligence.80 The information obtainable from ge-
netic data analysis continues to grow.
Second, there is a lack of transparency about the specific groups
that will have access to the data and their purpose.81 Because of rap-
idly developing technology and the enormous amount of potentially
meaningful information available, many parties are interested in ob-
taining genetic data. Pharmaceutical companies, clinical researchers,
73. GRISHIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
74. What is Precision Medicine?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept. 10, 2019), https://
ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/precisionmedicine/definition [https://perma.cc/823G-9YSL].
75. Elizabeth R. Pike, Securing Sequences: Ensuring Adequate Protections of Ge-
netic Samples in the Age of Big Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977, 1980 (2016).
76. Charles Seife, 23andMe Is Terrifying, but Not for the Reasons the FDA Thinks,
SCI. AM. (Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/23andme-is-terri-
fying-but-not-for-the-reasons-the-fda-thinks [https://perma.cc/2H4U-56AB].
77. Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional, 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 77, 88 (2003).
78. See Dankar et al., supra note 1, at 2.
79. Jennifer Lynch, DNA Collection is Not the Answer to Reuniting Families Split
Apart by Trump’s “Zero Tolerance” Program, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July
10, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/dna-collection-not-answer-reuniting-
families-split-apart-trumps-zero-tolerance [https://perma.cc/PFW8-N97X].
80. Antonio Regalado, DNA Tests for IQ Are Coming, but It Might Not Be Smart
to Take One, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
610339/dna-tests-for-iq-are-coming-but-it-might-not-be-smart-to-take-one/ [https://per
ma.cc/63LC-UUQL].
81. See Drabiak, supra note 17, at 162–63.
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employers,82 insurance companies, hospitals, and law enforcement all
might have varied interest in the information that genetic data can
provide.83 Consumers and patients may be interested in giving their
genetic data to researchers to help discover cures for diseases, but
may not be interested in helping a company make a profit by selling
their genetic data.84
Third, patients and consumers may lose control of their genetic data
in the current structure. Consent can help individuals learn about how
their data might be used,85 but many regulations seem to agree with
the idea that “the right to privacy ceases . . . with . . . consent.”86
Requiring consent from individuals before sharing their data helps
consumers to have more control, but researchers and companies often
collect samples before they know exactly how the data will be used,
whether the terms might change, and who might acquire the data
later.87 Consent may be too vague to give any amount of control if
researchers and companies collect information without an exact plan
for how it will be used and without specific information about who it
will be shared with.88 In addition, genetic information can implicate
family members who never donated DNA and never consented to
share any information.89 Since genetic information can implicate fam-
ily members who never consented, there is concern regarding whether
an individual’s consent for disclosure is enough.90 Further, genetic var-
iants are often reclassified.91 The information that can be obtained
from an individual’s data only grows with time.92 Since new discover-
ies can change the implications of genetic data, individuals may decide
after sharing that they no longer want their data to be available. The
82. John P. Dever & James A. Dever, A Democracy of Users, 6 J.L. & CYBER
WARFARE 8, 18 (2017).
83. Drabiak, supra note 17, at 143.
84. Maggie Fox, What You’re Giving Away with Those Home DNA Tests: It’s the
Most Valuable Thing You Own, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017, 8:46 AM CST), https://
www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/what-you-re-giving-away-those-home-dna-
tests-n824776 [https://perma.cc/UNR6-G6CV].
85. Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical
Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347, 372 (2007).
86. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 218 (1890).
87. See Vayena & Blasimme, supra note 72, at 121–22.
88. Id. at 120.
89. See Drabiak, supra note 17, at 162.
90. Genetic Information Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff
.org/issues/genetic-information-privacy (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
52PQ-MR9P].
91. See Ciara Curtin, At NSGC, Genetic Counselors Discuss Why, How Gene Vari-
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lack of specific, informed consent ultimately results in people losing
control of their genetic data.93
Fourth, genetic data available in databases provides a unique type
of privacy and security risk because of the difficulty with anonymiza-
tion.94 Many regulations allow sharing anonymous data, but genetic
data most likely cannot be anonymized.95 For example, there are
methods available to identify “anonymized” data.96 The researchers
behind one study found they could “deanonymize genomic data using
only publicly available Internet information and some clever detective
work.”97 Companies can buy “anonymized” health data and use new
technology to deanonymize data.98 Another study showed that even if
you have never provided your own DNA to a database, you could be
identified based on information provided by a distant relative.99
Finally, potential study participants often cite privacy concerns as a
reason for not participating in research.100 As a consequence, privacy
concerns impede research. When people do not feel protected by the
law and are concerned with how their data will be used, they are less
likely to participate.101 More protective data regulations may be justi-
fied sufficiently by guaranteeing security and privacy to encourage
participation in research and to promote advancements in medicine.
III. U.S. REGULATIONS: PROTECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
While different states disagree on exactly how much privacy protec-
tion individuals should be entitled to, every United States citizen has
93. See Fox, supra note 84.
94. See Dankar et al., supra note 1, at 7.
95. Id.
96. Policy for Sharing of Data Obtained in NIH Supported or Conducted Genome-
Wide Association Studies, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Aug. 28, 2007), https://nccih.nih.gov/
node/9680 [https://perma.cc/3ZQR-NG2B].
97. Rojahn, supra note 35. See also Gina Kolata, Web Hunt for DNA Sequences
Leaves Privacy Compromised, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/18/health/search-of-dna-sequences-reveals-full-identities.html [https://perma
.cc/U6ZL-UR49]; Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname
Inference, 339 SCI. 321, 321 (2013).
98. John Hickey, Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Opens Health Data Pri-
vacy to Attack, BERKELEY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2018), https://news.berkeley.edu/2018/12/
21/advancement-of-artificial-intelligence-opens-health-data-privacy-to-attack/ [https://
perma.cc/NW2S-YXX2].
99. Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State
Killer Can Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00
PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-
nab-golden-state-killer-can-home-about-60-white [https://perma.cc/VCY4-DRTX].
100. See Casie A. Genetti et al., Parental Interest in Genomic Sequencing of
Newborns: Enrollment Experience from the BabySeq Project, GENETICS MED. (Sept.
13, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41436-018-0105-6#article-info [https://per
ma.cc/7FF7-32SH].
101. See Adam Rogers, The House Health Plan Makes Your Genes a Preexisting
Condition, WIRED (May 4, 2017, 7:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/house-
health-plan-makes-genes-preexisting-condition/ [https://perma.cc/U5ME-7E7C].
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certain protections provided by federal regulations. But complying
with all regulations is challenging, and deciding which law applies in a
particular situation is not always clear.
The following hypothetical demonstrates some complexities of the
current privacy regulations: “Patient A” is an adult, living in the
United States, who thinks he may be at risk for cancer and wants to
get more information about his genetic predisposition to the disease.
Patient A visits a local hospital for a blood test and subsequent ge-
netic testing.102 Patient A also sends his DNA to a direct-to-consumer
genetic testing service. Additionally, Patient A wears a watch that
tracks his heart rate and exercise.
Who regulates the collection, processing, and storage of Patient A’s
genetic data? What happens if Patient A shares data from the genetic
company with his doctor? What if he shares data from his watch with
his doctor, and it is stored with his genetic information in his medical
record? Does the combination of new data change how it is regulated?
Does Patient A retain any control over his data? Does he have a cause
of action if there is a breach? If Patient A discovers that he has a
propensity for a certain type of cancer, does the law protect him and
prevent companies from using that information to make decisions?
A. Federal Regulations
The United States has many regulations that offer some protection
for patient and consumer privacy. However, the regulations are diffi-
cult to comply with because of their quantity and complexities, and
there are still many gaps in privacy protection. Federal regulations are
enacted to fix individual issues as they arise, with often very little con-
sideration about future developments.103 As a consequence, the vari-
ous regulations are complex and disconnected.104 The application of
each regulation varies, dependent on the business structure or indus-
try, the location of the parties, and how the data are used.105
102. There are many regulations that apply here that are beyond the scope of this
Comment. For example, CLIA standards regulate the quality of the laboratory prac-
tices and FDA standards regulate the clinical validity of the tests. For more informa-
tion about the various laws that apply in genomic research, see Leslie E. Wolf et al.,
The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MA-
TRIX 1 (2019). For information about consumer data protection laws, see Stacy-Ann
Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 2 (2018).
103. See generally Angela L. Morrison, A Research Revolution: Genetic Testing
Consumers Become Research (and Privacy) Guinea Pigs, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 573 (2011).
104. See generally id.
105. See id. at 598–99.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-1\TWL106.txt unknown Seq: 14  5-NOV-19 14:25
282 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
1. HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(“HIPAA”) is a federal law that regulates the use and disclosure of
medical records and health information controlled by covered entities
and their business associates.106 The HIPAA Privacy Rule limits ac-
cess to protected health information by restricting how that informa-
tion can be released and requiring authorization.107 Covered entities
that are subject to HIPAA regulations include most providers of
health plans and health care.108 The statute provides a cause of action
for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for
Civil Rights to enforce compliance through civil penalties and refers
criminal violations to the Department of Justice.109
But HIPAA has many exceptions that result in gaps in privacy pro-
tection. For example, there are several exceptions that allow sharing
information without authorization.110 HIPAA permits disclosing ge-
netic information without consent if the data have been de-identi-
fied.111 The statute considers protected health information to be de-
identified after removing eighteen identifying elements in the record,
although many have argued that genetic data can never truly be anon-
ymous.112 In addition, HIPAA permits disclosing health information
without authorization for “treatment, payment, and routine health
care operations”; public health; “specialized government functions, in-
cluding national security and intelligence operations”; law enforce-
106. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
107. HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ [https://perma.cc/5GC3-BVTU].
108. Your Privacy Rights Under HIPAA, TEX. L. HELP, https://texaslawhelp.org/
article/your-privacy-rights-under-hipaa (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
6FCG-6QKU].
109. Enforcement Process, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 7, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/enforcement-
process/index.html [https://perma.cc/VYE4-GXQU].
110. See Barbara J. Evans, HIPAA’s Individual Right of Access to Genomic Data:
Reconciling Safety and Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 7 (2018); Roberta
B. Ness, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research, 298 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2164, 2164 (2007); HIPAA for Professionals, supra note 107; 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.502(a)(1)(iv) (2015); Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Protect Genetic Informa-
tion?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/faq/354/does-hipaa-protect-genetic-information/index.html
html [https://perma.cc/GN4K-HDL2].
111. Morgan Leigh Tendam, The HIPAA-POTA-MESS: How HIPAA’s Weak En-
forcement Standards Have Led States to Create Confusing Medical Privacy Remedies,
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2015).
112. Jennifer Kulynych & Henry T. Greely, Clinical Genomics, Big Data, and Elec-
tronic Medical Records: Reconciling Patient Rights with Research When Privacy and
Science Collide, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 94, 115–16 (2017).
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ment; and “judicial and administrative proceedings.”113 HIPAA also
provides many research exceptions.114 Finally, HIPAA is directed at
covered entities, so genetic data processed and stored by non-covered
entities typically have no HIPAA protection.115
2. GINA
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”)
is a federal regulatory program designed to protect against genetic dis-
crimination by health insurers and employers.116 GINA restricts
health insurers and employers from using genetic information to make
coverage or employment decisions.117 The statute defines genetic in-
formation as “information about—(i) such individual’s genetic tests,
(ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the
manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such
individual.”118 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) investigates and enforces GINA claims.119
GINA may provide some protection against discrimination, but
GINA does not apply to employers with less than fifteen employ-
ees,120 military, or Indian Health Services.121 It also does not apply to
life insurance, disability insurance, or education.122 GINA does not
protect you if you already have symptoms or begin to show symp-
toms.123 GINA does not prevent insurers from basing their decisions
on current symptoms or a diagnosis of disease, even if a genetic test
113. The Law and Medical Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www




116. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 440 (2010).
117. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No. 110-
233, § 202, 122 Stat. 881, 907 (2008).
118. Id. § 101, 122 Stat. at 885.
119. What You Should Know: Questions and Answers About the Genetic Informa-
tion Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and Employment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTU-
NITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/gina_nondiscrimina
tion_act.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9HS4-B7F3].
120. Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/gina_qanda_smallbus.cfm (last
visited Sept. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BXC8-6LEZ] [hereinafter Information Non-
discrimination Act of 2008].
121. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, GENETIC ALLIANCE, THE GENET-
ICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR. JOHNS HOPKINS U. & NAT’L COALITION FOR HEALTH PROF.
EDUC. GENETICS (June 2010), http://www.ginahelp.org/GINAhelp.pdf [https://perma
.cc/N6HW-H8ED] [hereinafter Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act].
122. Sarah Zhang, The Loopholes in the Law Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination,
ATLANTIC (March 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/03/ge-
netic-discrimination-law-gina/519216/ [https://perma.cc/C3MJ-D8RZ].
123. Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, supra note 120; Rogers, supra
note 101.
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revealed the diagnosis.124 For example, if genetic testing reveals that a
person has a genetic mutation for a particular disease before showing
symptoms of it, an insurer cannot use that information to make deci-
sions about that person’s coverage or premiums because of GINA.125
But when they show symptoms of the disease, GINA no longer pro-
tects them.126
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) fills this gap and prevents
health insurers from discriminating based on preexisting conditions,127
but the current political climate suggests that the ACA could be over-
turned.128 If the ACA is overturned, GINA would prevent health in-
surance discrimination based on predicted diseases from genetic
information, but nothing would prohibit health insurance discrimina-
tion after that person shows symptoms or is diagnosed with the pre-
dicted disease.129
3. The Federal Trade Commission
If an entity is not covered by HIPAA, it only has to protect privacy
according to the much less stringent requirements of the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”). The FTC protects consumers from unfair
trade practices through regulation and enforcement of various laws.130
Unfair practices are defined as those “likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers them-
selves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition.”131
The FTC can bring actions against companies for being “deceptive”
if the company does not follow its own privacy practices or protect
consumer privacy adequately.132 For example, the FTC alleged that
Facebook committed unfair practices when the company shared infor-
mation without informed consent—a practice contrary to prior state-
ments that the company would give users more control over their
information.133 The FTC charged a different company for deceptive
124. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Lorelei E. Walker & Mark A. Rothstein, Are Genetic Discrimination Laws Up
to the Task?, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 8, 2012), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/7685
60#vp_2 [https://perma.cc/Q4WK-KVY3].
128. Vann R. Newkirk, The Federal Government Abandons the Most Popular Part
of the ACA, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2018/06/aca-preexisting-conditions-doj/562442/ [https://perma.cc/42YU-UQAA].
129. See Morrison, supra note 103.
130. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-
we-do (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/BWV2-EAFF].
131. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
132. SEDONA CONFERENCE, Data Privacy Primer, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 273, 331
(2018).
133. Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120
PENN ST. L. REV. 777, 789–90 (2016).
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practices because it automatically collected information about the
contacts on consumer phones, while a statement on the site implied
that the company would only collect data about contacts if the user
chose to do so.134
The FTC can also bring enforcement actions when a company’s
data security methods fail to protect sensitive consumer data, but
there are significant limits on that right.135 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the FTC had the authority to enforce data security
through its power to regulate unfair trade practices.136 But the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an FTC finding that a labora-
tory’s failure to maintain the security of customer data was an unfair
practice because the FTC’s order was vague.137 The Eleventh Circuit
held that an FTC order directing LabMD to create a more secure pro-
gram was unenforceable because it did not direct LabMD to “stop
committing a specific act,” but rather required the company to “over-
haul and replace its data-security program to meet an indeterminable
standard of reasonableness.”138
The FTC is especially limited if the company has set lax standards
for its privacy policies. The FTC cannot likely take action against com-
panies that directly tell consumers they will widely share user data.139
“If users do not do their homework on what information their apps
are collecting about them, and the app makers are not foolish enough
to outright lie about what they are doing, the FTC’s ability to control
how companies share our data is very limited.”140
B. State Regulations
Many states have passed different laws to protect genetic privacy
and prevent genetic discrimination. State laws vary widely in scope,
applicability, and the protection provided. “Ten state constitutions ref-
erence a right to privacy: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington.”141
Several states define genetic information as the individual’s personal
property.142 Some states prohibit genetic discrimination in life and dis-
134. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Relief at 4,
United States v. Path, Inc., No. C-13-0448 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2013).
135. SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 132, at 332.
136. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 779 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir.
2015).
137. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018).
138. Id. at 1223, 1236.
139. Lipman, supra note 133, at 790 (“For example, the company Groupon was
relatively open about the fact that it was going to widely share its users’ data (includ-
ing their location) so the FTC could not take action against them for doing so.”).
140. Id.
141. SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 132, at 331.
142. See, e.g., Deborah L. McLochlin, Whose Genetic Information Is It Anyway? A
Legal Analysis of the Effects That Mapping the Human Genome Will Have on Privacy
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ability insurance.143 Some restrict the redisclosure of genetic informa-
tion to a third party without consent.144 Some states have created
consequences for an unlawful disclosure, including criminal and civil
punishments and fines.145
California passed some of the strictest rules to protect data privacy
and prevent discrimination. In 2018, California passed the California
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”).146 The statute applies to any “com-
pany that does any amount of business in California if the company
collects or tells others to collect personal information of California
residents . . . .”147 The CCPA defines personal information broadly to
include any “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capa-
ble of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”148 “This includes
data from internet or network activity, such as browsing and search
history; data from a consumer’s interaction with a website, applica-
tion, or advertisement; biometric and geolocation data; and any infer-
ences that can be drawn from such information.”149 The statute gives
consumers the right to request a business delete their personal infor-
mation, the ability to opt out of businesses selling their information,
and provides a private right of action for consumers.150
California also passed the California Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (“CalGINA”) in 2011.151 CalGINA prohibits genetic
discrimination in several areas, including emergency medical services,
mortgage lending, and education.152 CalGINA also allows plaintiffs to
recover monetary damages not subject to damages caps.153
Rights and Genetic Discrimination, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 609,
634–35 (2001).
143. See Morrison, supra note 103, at 584.
144. Claire Marblestone, Privacy Issues in the Sharing of Genetic Information, FO-
LEY & LARDNER LLP (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.foley.com/privacy-issues-in-the-
sharing-of-genetic-information-09-18-2014/ [https://perma.cc/7MYZ-ZTPE].
145. Id.
146. A Letter from Alastair Mactaggart, Board Chair, Californians for Consumer
Privacy, CALIFORNIANS FOR CONSUMER PRIVACY, https://www.caprivacy.org/about-
us (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/P7ZL-5DVN].
147. John Conley & Isaac Newell, The Strictest Data Privacy Law in the U.S., PRI-
VACY REP. (July 31, 2018), https://theprivacyreport.com/2018/07/31/the-strictest-data-
privacy-law-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T32B-CG8Q].
148. California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o) (effective
Jan. 1, 2020).
149. Conley & Newell, supra note 147.
150. Id.
151. California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (CalGINA), S.B. 559,
2011 Leg. (Cal. 2011).
152. Id.
153. Nicole Baarts & Megha Charalambides, A New Year, A New Wellness Pro-
gram, CAL. PECULIARITIES EMP. L. BLOG (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.calpeculiarities
.com/2018/01/19/a-new-year-a-new-wellness-program/ [https://perma.cc/9RVH-DT
H8].
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California has taken some big steps to protect the privacy of its citi-
zens. But this creates compliance challenges for industries that process
and store information for customers in multiple states.154 The Califor-
nia regulations also create sharing and access problems because of the
variance between states.155
IV. GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION
The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is a compre-
hensive data regulation, promulgated by the European Union
(“EU”), enforceable as of May 2018.156 The regulation “standardizes
data protection law across all twenty-eight EU countries and imposes
strict new rules on controlling and processing personally identifiable
information.”157 The GDPR was enacted to give individuals more
rights, and the effects have been far-reaching.158 The GDPR applies to
any organization in any country that collects or processes the data of
EU citizens; it has had a global influence.159 American companies
spent an estimated $7.8 billion preparing for the enforcement date of
the GDPR.160 Instead of complying with the GDPR, some companies
closed.161 Other companies have implemented GDPR protections in-
ternationally—protecting all of their customers, not just those in the
EU.162
The regulation imposes stiff fines for non-compliance: up to $22
million or 4% of the worldwide annual revenue of the prior financial
year.163 The fine depends on ten criteria, among them: which articles
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. FUTURE PRIVACY F., supra note 33, at 11.
157. Kris Lahiri, What is General Data Protection Regulation?, FORBES (Feb. 14,
2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/02/14/what-is-general-data-
protection-regulation/#7e545ae562dd [https://perma.cc/7BDL-PVZ8].
158. See Kyle Petersen, GDPR: What (and Why) You Need to Know About EU
Data Protection Law, 31 UTAH B.J. 12, 12 (2018).
159. See generally id.
160. Oliver Smith, The GDPR Racket: Who’s Making Money From This $9bn Busi-
ness Shakedown, FORBES (May 2, 2018 2:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliver-
smith/2018/05/02/the-gdpr-racket-whos-making-money-from-this-9bn-business-shake
down/#3b0ff15234a2 [https://perma.cc/VV2H-Q7MW].
161. Ivana Kottasová, These Companies Are Getting Killed by GDPR, CNN BUS.
(May 11, 2018, 6:39 AM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-
tech-companies-losers/index.html [https://perma.cc/T96A-SU5N].
162. The EU General Data Protection Regulation, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (June 6,
2018, 5:00 AM EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-data-protec-
tion-regulation [https://perma.cc/69EM-4XWK] (“Microsoft, Apple, and Twitter an-
nounced that they would extend . . . some of the regulation’s protections to their
customers worldwide.”).
163. Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and
Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 60 (2018).
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were violated, the nature of the data, whether it was intentional, and
what preventative measures were taken.164
The GDPR requires that processors have a legal basis before
processing personal data.165 “Processing” is defined broadly and in-
cludes any action that involves coming into contact with data.166 “Per-
sonal data” is defined as any information that can be used to identify
someone.167 A legal reason must be identified before ever coming into
contact with any data that could identify someone.168
The GDPR puts significant limitations on data collection, process-
ing, and storing. Data collection must be limited to only what is abso-
lutely necessary, and processed with a specific purpose and high
standard of transparency.169 The GDPR requires companies to secure
consumer data and to limit storage to a timeframe that is absolutely
necessary.170 The GDPR also provides individual citizens with the
right to force companies to erase the personal data that the company
has about them.171
The GDPR is framed as a regulation generally prohibiting anyone
from processing sensitive data, with exceptions to that general rule.172
Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, politi-
cal opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union mem-
bership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning
health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orien-
tation shall be prohibited.173
The regulation defines genetic data as:
164. Fines and Penalties, GDPR EU.ORG, https://www.gdpreu.org/compliance/
fines-and-penalties/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/WG2M-VS26].
165. JOHNS HOPKINS MED., PREPARING FOR THE EU GDPR IN RESEARCH SET-
TINGS 3 (2018), https://www.jhsph.edu/offices-and-services/institutional-review-board/
_pdfs-and-docs/GDPR_Application%20in%20Research%20Settings.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/WL4Q-LUS9].
166. Id. at 8.
167. Matt Burgess, What Is GDPR? The Summary Guide to GDPR Gompliance in
the UK, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2019), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-leg-
islation-compliance-summary-fines-2018 https://perma.cc/CJ9D-LG39].
168. Monthly Newsletter GDPR: Accountability Privacy by Design and Privacy by





171. Burgess, supra note 167.
172. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Reg-
ulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 82 (2019).
173. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/
46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L119) 1, art. 9 [hereinafter
GDPR].
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[I]nherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a natural person
which give unique information about the physiology or health of
that natural person and which result, in particular, from an analysis
of a biological sample from the natural person in question . . . or
from the analysis of another element enabling equivalent informa-
tion to be obtained.174
Processing data in one of these special categories is prohibited, un-
less one of ten exemptions apply.175 But even if an exemption applies,
there must still be a legal basis for processing.176 Exemptions allow
processing sensitive data when it is necessary for public health, scien-
tific research, or when explicit consent is given.177 One exception is
when explicit consent is obtained from the subject, defined as a
“freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous indication of the
data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal
data relating to him or her.”178 Consent requires an action; clicking a
box or choosing a setting might be enough, but “pre-ticked boxes (in-
activity) [does] not constitute consent.”179 Even if there is explicit con-
sent, subjects may withdraw consent at any time.180
The GDPR also distinguishes between types of data that can be
anonymized. GDPR does not regulate anonymous data—data that
can no longer be identified.181 The GDPR defines whether data are
identifiable broadly, considering available technology.182 Whether
data are identifiable under the rule requires looking at “all the means
of identification . . . reasonably likely to be used by any person.”183
Whether a method is “reasonably likely to be used” involves an analy-
sis of the cost and time required and the available technology.184 Ap-
plying this definition currently, there could be anonymous genetic
data not subject to regulation that could be shared openly.185 For ex-
174. Chassang, supra note 28, at 5.
175. GDPR, supra note 173.
176. Itsiq Benizri, Martin Braun & Frédéric Louis, The Legal Basis for Processing
Personal Data in the Context of Clinical Trials in the EU: The European Data Protec-
tion Board Provides Some Clarifications, but Questions Remain, JD SUPRA (Feb. 20,
2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-legal-basis-for-processing-personal-
39916/ [https://perma.cc/QX6X-Z4M2].
177. GDPR, supra note 173.
178. Id. art. 4(11).
179. Monthly Newsletter: GDPR The Concept of Consent, DENTONS BOEKEL (Feb.
23, 2017), https://dentons.boekel.com/en/insights/alerts/2017/february/23/monthly-
newsletter-gdpr-the-concept-of-consent [https://perma.cc/4NXY-HUPE].
180. GDPR, supra note 173, art. 7(3).
181. See Mark Phillips, Can Genomic Data Be Anonymized?, GLOBAL ALLIANCE




184. Phillips, supra note 181.
185. Id.
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ample, it is possible that genetic variants specific to certain cancer
cells could be anonymous in some instances.186 By comparison, coded
genomic sequence datasets remain protected personal data under the
GDPR.187 These coded data sets would likely be defined as
pseudonymized data that can “no longer be attributed to a specific
data subject without the use of additional information.”188 The GDPR
regulates data given codes or pseudonyms as identifiable personal
data.189
The GDPR increases the privacy rights and protections for EU citi-
zens. The regulation limits unnecessary processing and provides a pri-
vate right of action for individuals whose rights have been violated.190
To pursue a cause of action, individuals only have to prove their infor-
mation was not processed within the limits of the law and no further
harms.191
But the GDPR has many critics with valid arguments. For example,
the terms of the GDPR are expensive to comply with.192 The signifi-
cant costs associated with compliance could lead to a disadvantage for
smaller companies with less resources.193 There are also ambiguities in
the regulation: the GDPR requires “reasonable” protection of per-
sonal data without clearly defining what constitutes reasonable.194
This could create problems with both compliance and enforcement.195
Further, some have suggested that the research exemption for
processing sensitive data may be too broad.196 Defining the research
exception may be left up to the EU states and cause more confusion
with regard to compliance.197
V. ADOPTING A FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY REGULATION
Sharing genetic data can be useful in the right hands, but it involves
many privacy concerns and risks. Individuals can use this information
to improve medical treatment, and researchers can learn more about
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. JOHNS HOPKINS MED., supra note 165, at 2.
189. Phillips, supra note 181.
190. Burgess, supra note 167.
191. GDPR, supra note 173, art. 82(1).
192. See Kottasová, supra note 161.
193. Id.
194. Mike Meikle, GDPR’s First 150 Days Impact on the U.S., THREATPOST (Nov.
1, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://threatpost.com/gdprs-first-150-days-impact-on-the-u-s/
138739/ [https://perma.cc/VWT8-BV8B].
195. Id.
196. Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON
HALL L. REV. 995, 1012–15 (2017).
197. Rita T. Lawlor, Zisis Kozlakidis, & Marianna Beldsoe, GDPR in Biobanking
for Precision Medicine Research: The Challenges, OPEN ACCESS GOV’T (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/gdpr-in-biobanking-for-precision-
medicine/54468/ [https://perma.cc/U63V-T57M].
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rare diseases, but these important uses do not completely negate the
duty to protect individual privacy.
Although there is some ambiguity about where a person’s privacy
entitlements truly come from, courts have held that medical and
health information are entitled to privacy.198 “An individual has a
constitutional right to privacy which protects ‘the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’”199 In United States v. West-
inghouse Electric Corporation, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that “an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate
facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials enti-
tled to privacy protection.”200 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court
held that “the doctor-patient relationship is one of the zones of pri-
vacy accorded constitutional protection.”201 However, the concurring
opinion by Justice Stewart stated there is no “general constitutional
right to privacy,” but the general right “to be left alone by other peo-
ple” is determined by the individual states.202 These cases share the
idea that medical information should be private, even if there is not
agreement about where the right should ultimately come from. But
these cases were decided before private companies—often outside of
the doctor-patient relationship—began obtaining, processing, storing,
and sharing genomic data on very large scales.203
Because genetic data present unique privacy risks, finding a solution
is challenging. There have been many solutions proposed.204 One solu-
tion proposed extending HIPAA data portability requirements to any
198. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980).
199. Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
200. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577.
201. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596 (1977).
202. Id. at 607–08 (Stewart J., concurring) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967)).
203. See Drabiak, supra note 17, at 160 (“The massive paradigm shift from collect-
ing genomic and health information in the healthcare setting to the commercial arena
means the transaction . . . may occur outside the scope of regulatory structures de-
signed to protect health data privacy and to ensure that companies have consumers’
informed consent when they provide DNA.”).
204. See generally Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(2015) (discussing property rights in DNA); Sejin Ahn, Whose Genome is it Anyway?
Re-Identification and Privacy Protection in Public and Participatory Genomics, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 751, 804–05 (2015) (treating DNA as personal property and limiting
with a digital signature); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 205 (2012) (allowing tort recovery under the tort of intrusion); Bartha
Maria Knoppers, Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related
Data, 8 HUGO J. 1, 6 (2014) (various frameworks and best practices); Amy L. Mc-
Guire et al., Confidentiality, Privacy, and Security of Genetic and Genomic Test Infor-
mation in Electronic Health Records: Points to Consider, 10 GENETICS MED. 495,
496–97 (2008) (discussing considering certain characteristics when developing policies
such as predictive capability, immutability, and uniqueness).
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entity that manages health data205 with “[t]he goal [of] uniformity of
data access policy, regardless of covered entity, business associate, or
other commercial status.”206 The numerous, diverse proposals illus-
trate the complexity in finding an adequate solution.
The ideal solution would give individuals control and privacy while
promoting research and innovation. Adopting a federal data privacy
regulation for sensitive data could protect individuals better than our
current regulations.207 A general prohibition on processing sensitive
data would be more protective of individual privacy.208 The United
States could adopt a regulation broad enough to adapt to changes in
technology, but narrow enough to protect privacy and allow for medi-
cal innovation.
A. Upstream Privacy Protection
The various regulations that protect the privacy of American citi-
zens are not really privacy regulations, but function as data use and
disclosure rules.209 Regulations in the United States seem to be more
concerned with the industry that the company is in and less concerned
with the nature of the data and how it is being used.210 For example,
the current federal regulations are more protective of health data
when a doctor’s office or hospital is processing genetic data and less
protective when a company has the data.211 This is probably not be-
cause individuals trust private companies more than their doctors but
rather is a result of sector-specific regulations.
One way of viewing data protection models is downstream and up-
stream.212 Upstream data protection models regulate collection.213 In
an upstream model, privacy is a concern at the earliest stages of col-
lection, before the data are obtained.214 Downstream models regulate
disclosure after data are obtained or stored.215 Downstream models
205. Jessica Kim Cohen, HIPAA Changes Needed, According to Health IT Trade
Groups, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REP. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.beckershos-
pitalreview.com/cybersecurity/hipaa-changes-needed-according-to-health-it-trade-
groups.html?origin=cioe&utm_source=cioe [https://perma.cc/7UQA-JS67].
206. HIPPA Modernization Needed, Experts Say, AMIA (Dec. 5, 2018), https://
www.amia.org/news-and-publications/press-release/hipaa-modernization-needed-ex-
perts-say [https://perma.cc/UN3S-M5F5].
207. See JOHNS HOPKINS MED., supra note 165, at 1.
208. Id.
209. See JOHNS HOPKINS MED., supra note 165, at 2.
210. See JOHNS HOPKINS MED., supra note 165, at 6.
211. See id. at 9.
212. Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24
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often protect collected data by restricting disclosure and requiring cer-
tain security standards.216
The majority of United States healthcare privacy regulations are
downstream models that regulate use and disclosure.217 Federal pri-
vacy rules regulate according to the sector the company is in.218
HIPAA regulates downstream because it controls how information
can be disclosed.219 HIPAA “imposes physical and technological con-
straints on patient data storage designed to make it difficult for those
outside of the health care system to acquire such data without
consent.”220
By comparison, the GDPR is an upstream model.221 It is an overall
ban on processing sensitive data, with exceptions to the overall rule.222
Under the GDPR, certain measures have to be implemented before
data can be collected.223 The controller must decide the lawful basis
for collecting data prior to collection.224 Thus, data privacy is a con-
cern in the beginning stages of designing products and before
collection.225
Restricting who can process genetic data may protect individual pri-
vacy better and make discrimination less likely.226 Rather than relying
on what sector the company is in or what harms have occurred, in an
upstream model, there is a limit on obtaining the data in the first
place.227 Moreover, while genetic data is a type of “health data,” there
are many parties interested in obtaining genetic data that are not in
the healthcare sector.228 Proving that a party obtained genetic data
and used it to discriminate is very difficult.229 Limiting who can pro-
cess sensitive data may make discrimination less likely by not only
limiting access, but also by not requiring an individual to prove dis-
crimination to have a cause of action.230 An entity processing genetic
data (when an exception does not apply) breaks the law, and no fur-
ther harms have to be proven.231
216. Id. at 103.
217. Id. at 67.
218. Id. at 89.
219. Id. at 68.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 105.
222. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 172.
223. See Petersen, supra note 158, at 16.
224. See id.; see also Benizri, Braun & Louis, supra note 176.
225. See Petersen, supra note 158, at 15.
226. See generally Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk,
91 WASH. L. REV. 703 (2016).
227. See Petersen, supra note 158, at 16.
228. See Vayena & Blasimme, supra note 72, at 121; Drabiak, supra note 17, at 145.
229. See Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetic Exceptionalism: Do We
Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 717–18 (2001).
230. See id.
231. GDPR, supra note 173, art. 82(1) (providing a private right of action to en-
force data privacy rights).
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B. Adaptability
A federal regulation for sensitive data would protect individual pri-
vacy best if it is adaptable. First, it will likely remain effective if it is
broad and based on core principles that promote privacy.232 Regula-
tions based on principles are more likely to remain effective in sectors
that are developing and changing quickly.233 Over time, narrow rules
may be less effective; the results become more likely to deviate from
legislative intent.234 Narrow rules are also more likely to be unfairly
applied among industries.235
Compared to adopting another narrow rule in one limited sector, a
regulation framed similarly to the GDPR would be more effective
over time.236 The GDPR rules are broad, and they are based on core
principles of individual rights and privacy protection.237 The GDPR
lists 173 Recitals238 that establish principles ranging from “data pro-
tection is a fundamental right” to “the protection of personal data . . .
balanced against other fundamental rights.”239 The GDPR prohibition
on processing sensitive data is broad and based on a core principle:
that sensitive data “merit specific protection” because of the inherent
risks to “fundamental rights and freedoms.”240
The GDPR rules also have broad, inclusive definitions.241 The
GDPR broadly defines “processing” as any operation or action that
involves coming into contact with data.242 By comparison, HIPAA de-
fines “use” specifically, including sharing, applying, and examining.243
HIPAA’s narrow definition creates loopholes; it provides more oppor-
tunities for entities to process data without violating the statute.244
Second, a regulation allowing patients to revoke their data could
adapt to the constant advances that increase the amount of informa-
tion obtainable from genetic data.245 Knowledge about genetic predis-
positions to traits and diseases grows with technology and research.246
This undetermined future progression makes it impossible “to quan-
tify the amount and sensitivity of personal information that can be
232. Id. recitals 1, 4.
233. Regulation & the Economy: The Relationship & How to Improve It, COMMIT-





237. GDPR, supra note 173, recitals 1, 2.
238. Id. recitals 1–173.
239. See id.
240. Id. recital 51.
241. See id. art. 4.
242. Id.
243. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
244. See id.
245. McGuire et al., supra note 204, at 495, 499.
246. Id. at 497.
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derived from [genomic data].”247 Patients and consumers should be
able to share this information if they choose to, but should be able to
revoke their consent if the changes make it something they no longer
want to share.
Third, a regulation with broad definitions could adapt to the ex-
panding uses of genetic data.248 Genetic analysis continues to inte-
grate with other health records.249 Further, many types of health data
can implicate genetics.250 The line between health data and genetic
data is difficult to separate; recent advancements have further blurred
this line.251 In 2012, the FTC “acknowledged . . . that ‘the traditional
distinction between [personally identifiable information and non-per-
sonally identifiable information] has blurred’ and suggested that ‘it is
appropriate to more comprehensively examine data to determine the
data’s privacy implications.’”252 The FTC looked at consumer data
that could “be reasonably linked to a specific . . . device” instead of
regulating particular categories.253 Similarly, a regulation with broad
definitions could protect individual privacy in a time of massive collec-
tion and storage of various data that can be connected and used in
novel ways.254
Finally, a new regulation could protect privacy by solving some of
HIPAA’s problems with identifiable data. Similar to the GDPR, the
regulation could be flexible and accommodate changes by considering
available technology when defining anonymous data.255 HIPAA speci-
fies how to deidentify information while the GDPR definition does
not.256 HIPAA allows researchers to remove certain information from
datasets and share the data, despite evidence that it can likely be rei-
dentified.257 “A data set that is ‘de-identified’ under HIPAA is not
necessarily anonymized under the GDPR.”258 The GDPR analysis for
determining whether data is identifiable is adaptable.259 When data
247. Dankar et al., supra note 1, at 2.
248. McGuire et al., supra note 204, at 498.
249. Id. at 495.
250. Id. at 496.
251. See id. at 496, 498.
252. Alexander E. Reicher & Yan Fang, FTC Privacy and Data Security Enforce-
ment and Guidance Under Section 5, J. ANTITRUST UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. B. CAL.
(2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/jsp/fileDL.php?fID=5347 [https://
perma.cc/2ARY-JEWZ] (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND




254. Dankar et al., supra note 1, at 2.
255. GDPR, supra note 173, recital 26.
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become identifiable because of a change in technology, it is no longer
anonymous under the GDPR rules.260
VI. CONCLUSION
The GDPR was adopted to replace the numerous, conflicting data
protection laws of various EU states.261 The GDPR gives individuals
more control and more privacy at a critical time: when companies are
pervasively capturing, sharing, and selling private genetic information
and with rapid technology development.262 The “GDPR is fundamen-
tally different from U.S. regulations” because it requires companies to
“respect & empower [its] customers.”263 Many U.S. citizens and com-
panies have called for a regulation similar to the GDPR.264
Individual privacy protections are especially important with perva-
sive collection and storing, but individual privacy has to be balanced
with the desire to promote innovation and improve healthcare. A new
data regulation could provide privacy protection despite rapid devel-
opments. The regulation could be narrow enough to promote innova-
tion, but broad enough to continue to protect privacy despite changes
in technology. The regulation could give people more control and pro-
vide protection from discrimination.265 People are hesitant to partici-
pate in research when they are not sure what will happen to their data
and when they are not confident that the current regulations will pro-
tect them.266 A new regulation could give people more confidence
that their rights are protected and that they will retain some control
over future uses of their data. A more protective regulation could give
people more incentive to participate in research projects.
DNA tests provide genetic information that can cause social
stigma267 and provide information about a person’s most private med-
ical information.268 But the current state of data collection research
implicates other health data along with genetics.269 A new regulation
260. GDPR, supra note 173, recital 26.
261. See Petersen, supra note 158, at 12.
262. Id. at 15.
263. Mike Lloyd, The Biggest GDPR Mistake U.S. Companies Are Making, FORBES
(June 12, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/12/
the-biggest-gdpr-mistake-u-s-companies-are-making/#33cb404969f0 [https://perma.cc/
Q5LE-ZDXU].
264. James Vincent, Tim Cook Warns of ‘Data-Industrial Complex’ in Call for
Comprehensive US Privacy Laws, VERGE (Oct. 24, 2018, 5:08 AM EDT), https://www
.theverge.com/2018/10/24/18017842/tim-cook-data-privacy-laws-us-speech-brussels
[https://perma.cc/G43G-TXCM].
265. Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an An-
tidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 645–47 (2013).
266. See Genetti et al., supra note 100.
267. James P. Evans & Wylie Burke, Genetic Exceptionalism. Too Much of a Good
Thing? 10 NATURE 500, 500 (2008).
268. See Drabiak, supra note 17, at 143.
269. See id. at 147.
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should not just consider the known, current uses of genetic data. The
regulation should be broad enough to consider future unknown uses.
A new regulation could increase the rights of individuals in relation
to their data, limit unnecessary processing, and provide more clarity
for compliance.270 Under the proposed legislation, whether a patient
visits a local hospital for a blood test and subsequent genetic testing or
sends his DNA to a popular direct-to-consumer genetic testing ser-
vice, the person retains ultimate control over their data. If they travel
to a different state or transfer the data to another company, their data
continue to be protected.
A new regulation could replace the incoherencies and disjointed-
ness of the federal, state, and sector-specific regulations with a regula-
tion that applies to everyone and adapts over time. Not only would it
give more uniformity and clarity to individuals, businesses, and gov-
ernment entities, it would likely be applicable and adaptable to future
developments and undetermined future scenarios. The current regula-
tions have not adapted to innovation. The United States needs to en-
act legislation that considers the current state of genetic data
processing and health privacy protection. The United States could
protect and empower its citizens by learning from the EU model and
adopting a federal privacy regulation.
270. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 23rd Com-
puters, Freedom, and Privacy Conference: Reclaim Your Name (June 26, 2013), http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130626computersfreedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FXL-
6CWN].
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